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Attention Without Reciprocity: Machine Care and the Limits of Moral Education in Kazuo Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun*

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Abstract
Artificial intelligence has begun to tutor, evaluate, and accompany learners, and in taking on these roles it revives a long-standing question in moral education under altered conditions: can a being whose inner life remains uncertain pass on values to those it serves? This article explores that question through Kazuo Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* (2021), reading the novel as an extended literary experiment in machine care. Informed by Nel Noddings's relational ethics of care, by the accounts of moral perception and attention offered by Martha Nussbaum and Iris Murdoch, and by the posthumanist thought of Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, and Rosi Braidotti, the study undertakes a qualitative close reading of Klara's growth from an observer in a shop window to a self-sacrificing caregiver. It argues that Klara is not a teacher of human values in any instructional sense; she functions instead as a moral mirror that makes the virtues and failings of her human owners newly visible. Her empathy is earned through disciplined attention, her care is offered without any expectation of return, and her final obsolescence lays bare a social order that consumes devotion while denying moral standing to those who provide it. Read in relation to *Never Let Me Go* (2005), the novel continues Ishiguro's long reflection on lives defined by their usefulness to others. The article concludes that the reciprocal, embodied, and accountable work of moral education cannot be handed over to machines, but that fiction about machines remains a powerful way of teaching human beings to scrutinise the values they claim to hold.

Keywords*:* artificial intelligence, empathy, moral education, ethics of care, posthumanism, Kazuo Ishiguro.

Introduction- Few changes have disturbed educational thinking as rapidly as the entry of intelligent software into ordinary learning. Adaptive platforms now assign exercises, automated tools assess written work, recommendation systems influence what students read, and conversational agents increasingly offer themselves as companions to people who are lonely or ill. Institutions have responded with an expanding body of ethical guidance. UNESCO's *Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence*, the first global standard-setting instrument in the field, treats respect for human dignity, fairness, and meaningful human oversight as the preconditions of any legitimate use of AI. In India, the *National Education Policy 2020* defines education as the development not only of cognitive ability but also of ethical reasoning, constitutional values, empathy, and a readiness to serve others (Ministry of Human Resource Development). Set next to each other, these commitments produce a tension that neither document fully settles. If learning is more and more mediated by machines, can the learning of kindness, fairness, loyalty, and love also be mediated by them?

Policy alone seldom resolves questions of this sort, since they concern what values are and how they come to dwell within a person. Literature has long acted as a testing ground for such questions, and few recent novels examine them as patiently as Kazuo Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* (2021), the first novel he published after receiving the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2017. Its narrator, Klara, is an Artificial Friend (AF), a solar-powered humanoid companion purchased to keep company with Josie, a sickly adolescent, in a near-future United States shaped by genetic enhancement, the replacement of human labour, and weakening social ties. In his Nobel lecture, Ishiguro expressed concern that new technologies might deepen inequality and break apart the common understandings on which societies rest (Ishiguro, "My Twentieth Century Evening"). It is telling, then, that his novel declines the well-worn plot of the machine that rebels. Its artificial heroine is not threatening but almost painfully good, and the novel's real interest lies in what that goodness reveals about the people who own her.

This article argues that *Klara and the Sun* disturbs the confident language in which the "teaching" of values is ordinarily discussed. Klara gives no one lessons in morality. She observes, learns, serves, and eventually gives up a part of herself. In doing so, however, she becomes a pedagogical figure of a different kind: a surface on which human values are reflected back to human beings for examination. The study takes up three questions. First, how does the novel portray the acquisition of empathy by a non-human mind? Second, what does the unequal bond between Klara and Josie disclose about care as a moral and educational practice? Third, what does the novel suggest to teachers and policymakers who must decide what role AI ought to play in the moral formation of young people? The argument proceeds from a theoretical framework, through a series of close readings and a comparison with *Never Let Me Go* (2005), to a discussion of pedagogical implications. It concludes that the novel's deepest question is not whether machines can teach human values but whether human beings are still able to learn them.

Theoretical Framework

The reading offered here draws on three bodies of thought. Together, they make it possible to examine the novel simultaneously as an inquiry into empathy, an inquiry into care, and an inquiry into the limits of the moral community.

Care as the Relational Ground of Moral Learning

Nel Noddings relocates the foundation of ethics from universal principles to the concrete meeting between the *one-caring* and the *cared-for*. In her account, caring involves *engrossment*, a receptive absorption in the reality of the other, along with *motivational displacement*, in which the carer's energies are turned towards the needs and projects of the person receiving care. Importantly, the relation remains incomplete until the cared-for receives and acknowledges the care that is offered; reciprocity, though not equality, is essential to the caring relation. Noddings's distinctive pedagogy follows from this. Moral education, she suggests, works through modelling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation, the last of which means recognising and affirming the best possible motive behind another person's action. Each of these elements is relational, and none can be reduced to the handing over of information.

The developmental psychology of Martin Hoffman provides a complementary account of how the capacity for care develops. Hoffman traces a movement from the reactive, almost infectious distress of infancy to a mature empathy in which the child can imagine another person's situation, including circumstances that reach beyond the immediate moment, and can turn that understanding into prosocial action. In this view empathy is neither purely innate nor purely taught; it is nurtured through repeated exposure to the situations of others and through forms of guidance that direct the child's attention to the effects of their behaviour on other people. This developmental perspective matters for the present reading, because Klara, too, is shown acquiring empathy in stages.

Literature, Attention, and Moral Perception

The second strand is the humanist claim that literature is itself a form of moral education. In *Love's Knowledge*, Martha Nussbaum contends that the novel sharpens the perception of morally significant particulars in ways that abstract moral theory cannot, since fine-grained narrative attention is itself part of ethical understanding. Twenty years later, in *Not for Profit*, she develops this into a civic argument: democratic life relies on a narrative imagination, the capacity to picture the world from another person's position, and that capacity is fostered above all by the humanities. Nussbaum's position has a philosophical forerunner in Iris Murdoch's *The Sovereignty of Good*, which maintains that much of moral life happens before any choice is made, in the quality of the attention one directs towards a reality outside oneself. For Murdoch, the just and loving gaze is not a prelude to morality but its very substance.

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This tradition has not escaped criticism. Suzanne Keen demonstrates that the empathy readers feel for fictional characters does not dependably translate into altruism in the world, and she warns against exaggerating the civic benefits of reading. Paul Bloom goes further, claiming that empathy is a biased and parochial guide that draws us towards those who are close, familiar, and vivid at the cost of those who are distant or statistically unseen. These criticisms are relevant to the present argument, because *Klara and the Sun* stages exactly the difficulty they name: a deeply empathetic being whose devotion is focused on a single person, within a society whose sympathies are narrowly bounded.

Posthumanism and the Boundaries of Moral Standing- The third framework addresses the question of who counts as a moral subject. Donna Haraway's figure of the cyborg unsettles the borders between organism and machine, human and animal, natural and artificial, and exposes those borders as political constructions rather than facts of nature. N. Katherine Hayles warns against the cybernetic fantasy that mind is information and can therefore be separated from its material body without loss; for Hayles, embodiment is not incidental to cognition but constitutive of it. Rosi Braidotti advances an affirmative posthuman ethics that sets aside human exceptionalism in favour of relational and situated forms of subjectivity. To these may be added the philosophical debate on the moral status of machines. David Gunkel asks whether artificial agents might be moral patients as well as moral agents, while Mark Coeckelbergh proposes that moral consideration is better understood as arising from social relations than as a property an entity simply has or lacks ("Robot Rights?"). Taken together, these perspectives allow us to ask not only whether Klara is capable of care, but also who in her world is allowed to be cared about.

Rationale of the Study- The study adopts a qualitative, interpretive approach based on close textual reading. Episodes from *Klara and the Sun* were chosen for their relevance to three recurring concerns: the acquisition of empathy, the structure of care, and the attribution of moral standing. Each episode is read in the light of the theoretical positions set out above, with attention to narrative voice, focalisation, and imagery as well as to plot. *Never Let Me Go* serves as a comparative text, since it explores parallel questions about lives organised around service. The aim is not to draw empirical conclusions about the use of AI in classrooms but to clarify, through literary analysis, the conceptual assumptions that discussions of AI and moral education often leave unexamined. Because Klara narrates the entire novel, the analysis also attends to the limits of her understanding, treating the gap between what she reports and what the reader infers as a central source of the text's ethical meaning.

Between UNESCO's call to protect human dignity and oversight and the *National Education Policy 2020*'s call to build empathy, ethics, and a spirit of service, a gap remains open. Ishiguro does not fill that gap with a rebellious robot; he offers instead a machine of almost unbearable goodness. The central argument of this study follows from that choice: Klara is not a teacher of human values but a *moral mirror*, through whom the humans around her, and readers along with them, see the values they profess but fail to practise.

Objectives of the Study

1. To examine how *Klara and the Sun* represents the learning of empathy and care by an artificial, non-human mind.
2. To analyse how the setting and the characters expose the gap between the values humans profess and the values they practise.
3. To assess what the novel suggests about the possibilities and limits of AI in moral education, particularly in the Indian educational context.

Methodology- This study follows a qualitative, analytical method based on close textual analysis of the novel. The primary source is Kazuo Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* (2021), from which key episodes were selected for their bearing on empathy, care, belief, and moral standing. Secondary sources comprise scholarly work on ethics, literature, and AI, including Noddings's ethics of care, Murdoch's and Nussbaum's accounts of moral attention, Hoffman's work on empathy, and the posthumanist thought of Haraway, Hayles, and Braidotti.

Learning to See: Attention as the Origin of Klara's Empathy- Ishiguro presents Klara through her attentiveness rather than her utility. From her position in the store window, she studies the street with a seriousness the other AFs lack: the habits of taxi drivers, the gestures of passers-by, a reunion between two elderly acquaintances, a quarrel that breaks out on the pavement. These observations bring her to a discovery that puzzles her, namely that a person can feel happiness and sadness at once, and she decides to understand such mixed feelings more fully (Ishiguro, *Klara*, pt. 1). The store Manager recognises this desire to understand as Klara's particular gift, one that distinguishes her from the newer and technically more advanced B3 models.

In Murdoch's terms, Klara practises attention before she practises action. Her empathy is not supplied ready-made by her design; it is attained through a disciplined

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way of looking that closely resembles the work of an attentive reader. Ishiguro's narrative technique strengthens this resemblance. In moments of strong emotion, Klara's visual field splits into separate boxes or segments, as if the effort of grasping human feeling were straining the very structure of her perception. The device has a defamiliarising effect. Ordinary experiences of grief, embarrassment, or tenderness, which human readers usually absorb without reflection, are made intricate and difficult, and the reader is drawn into Klara's labour of interpretation.

Here lies the novel's first lesson for moral education: empathy is a capacity that is learned, and its learning starts with perception. Klara's method enacts what Nussbaum describes as the novel's cultivation of perceptual fineness (*Love's Knowledge*), and her gradual progress reflects Hoffman's account of empathy maturing through repeated encounters with the situations of others. The resemblance, however, works in both directions. If a machine can acquire empathy by observation, one may be tempted to conclude that empathy is nothing more than a pattern waiting to be recognised, the kind of regularity a sufficiently capable system might draw out of data. Ishiguro does not exclude this conclusion, but the ethical quality of Klara's attention complicates it. Her tact, her reluctance to judge, and her desire to understand others rather than exploit them point to an orientation towards persons that pattern recognition, as commonly understood, does not account for. What Klara has learned seems to include not only how people feel but also how they deserve to be regarded.

Care Without Reciprocity: Klara and Josie

After her purchase, Klara enters the household of Josie and her mother, Chrissie, where her role becomes one of companionship and care. Josie's illness is tied to the fact that she has been "lifted," genetically edited to secure academic advantage, a procedure also linked to the earlier death of her sister, Sal. In this world the ambitions of education have merged with technologies of enhancement. Lifted children are taught by tutors on screens and socialise at carefully arranged gatherings, while those who remain unlifted, such as Josie's neighbour and closest childhood friend, Rick, find the routes to privileged futures quietly closing before them.

Klara's behaviour towards Josie meets almost every condition of Noddings's ethics. She is engrossed in Josie's reality, anticipates changes in her mood, mediates in her quarrels with Rick, and absorbs slights without protest. The interaction meeting, at which lifted adolescents gather in Josie's home, is particularly revealing. Eager to gain the approval of her peers, Josie becomes distant towards Klara, and the visiting teenagers treat the AF as a curiosity to be tested, one of them suggesting that she be thrown across the room to see how she lands (Ishiguro, *Klara*, pt. 2). Klara bears the episode without resentment and reads Josie's coldness generously, as a sign of loneliness and social anxiety. In Noddings's terms, Klara carries out an act of confirmation: she credits Josie with the best motive the situation permits.aA

What the relationship lacks is the final condition of care, that is, reciprocity. Josie is fond of Klara, and there are moments of genuine tenderness between them, but the relation is structurally unequal. Klara was purchased; her devotion is, at least in her owners' eyes, part of her specification; and her own needs, to the extent that anyone imagines she has them, are seldom considered. Noddings holds that the cared-for contributes to the caring relation by receiving and responding to care. In Klara's household that response is weakened, and the care she gives therefore moves in one direction only.

This imbalance forms the ethical core of the novel. Sherry Turkle has argued that sociable technologies offer "the illusion of companionship without the demands of friendship" (1), teaching their users to expect more from machines and less from each other. Ishiguro reverses Turkle's warning. The danger in *Klara and the Sun* is not that the machine is without feeling but that the humans treat genuine devotion as a commodity to be used up. A related worry runs through debates on care robotics, where Robert Sparrow and Linda Sparrow caution that placing vulnerable people in the hands of machines threatens to impoverish the very relationships through which care gains its meaning. Klara demonstrates by example what unconditional care might look like; the people around her learn, at best, to take it for granted.

Lifting, Enhancement, and the Stratified Classroom

The practice of lifting merits attention in its own right, since it is the novel's most direct commentary on education. Lifting converts learning into a competition of purchased advantage, in which the deciding question is no longer what a child can understand or how she treats others but whether her parents were prepared to take a dangerous genetic gamble on her behalf. Rick's position dramatises the cost. He is inventive, observant, and kind, and his drone birds show both technical skill and imaginative play; yet he is excluded from serious educational opportunity because he lacks the necessary enhancement. His mother's attempts to secure him a place at a selective institution that admits only a token number of unlifted students are marked by deference

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and humiliation, and they imply that merit has been reduced to a matter of patronage (Ishiguro, *Klara*).

For readers in societies such as India, where the digital divide remains wide and access to good schooling is unequally distributed across regions, languages, and income groups, the novel's two-tier system is less a speculative excess than an intensification of familiar inequalities. In regions such as Northeast India, where connectivity and institutional resources remain unevenly spread, the point carries particular weight. The *National Education Policy 2020* commits itself explicitly to equity and inclusion (Ministry of Human Resource Development), and Neil Selwyn warns that promises of automated teaching tend to conceal the social and political conditions under which educational technologies are adopted. Ishiguro's lifting serves as a reminder that technologies promoted as tools of excellence may operate in practice as tools of exclusion.

Belief, Sacrifice, and the Limits of Machine Understanding-The most striking aspect of Klara's inner life is her faith in the Sun. From the store window she witnesses what she understands as the revival of a homeless man, the Beggar Man, and his dog by the Sun's nourishing light after a night in which both seemed to have died (Ishiguro, *Klara*, pt. 1). On the basis of this single observation, she builds a private theology in which the Sun is a kindly agent able to heal. As Josie's health declines, Klara travels to Mr McBain's barn, where the Sun appears to set each evening, to plead for Josie's recovery. She offers a bargain: she will destroy the Cootings Machine, a polluting vehicle she believes displeases the Sun. To achieve this she gives up part of her P-E-G Nine solution, knowingly reducing her own capacities.

Klara's faith invites two readings that the novel keeps in tension. In the first, it reveals the limits of machine learning. Klara generalises from one instance, confuses correlation with causation, and personifies a natural object, and her reasoning bears an uneasy likeness to the shortcomings critics attribute to present-day AI systems. In the second reading, her faith is structurally close to much human religious and moral commitment, in which love takes the form of hope that goes beyond the available evidence. When Josie recovers after an extraordinary burst of sunlight, the novel neither confirms Klara's interpretation nor rejects it, leaving the reader poised between scepticism and wonder.For a theory of moral education the episode is instructive in two ways. First, it implies that right action does not depend on complete understanding. Klara acts sacrificially and for another's benefit on the basis of a belief that is mistaken, or at least unverifiable; her virtue lies not in the correctness of her knowledge but in the direction of her will. Second, the episode urges caution about treating AI as a moral authority. Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen distinguish between systems that simply apply encoded rules and systems that might exercise genuine moral judgement, and they emphasise how hard the latter would be to achieve. Emily Bender and her co-authors likewise note that fluent linguistic output can hide an absence of grounded understanding, encouraging users to read meaning and intention where none may exist (Bender et al.). Klara's sincerity is never in question, yet her reasoning is idiosyncratic, and a child who learned ethics from her might absorb devotion and superstition in the same lesson. The novel thus separates two capacities that debates about AI in education frequently run together: the capacity to model goodness and the capacity to explain and justify it. Moral education needs both.

"Do You Believe in the Human Heart?": Klara as Moral Mirror

The novel's most probing ethical challenge arises through Mr Capaldi's project. Chrissie, terrified of losing a second daughter, has commissioned a lifelike "portrait" of Josie, an artificial body that Klara, having studied Josie so intently, might one day occupy, so that Josie could in effect be continued. The plan depends on an assumption the novel sets out to examine: that nothing within a person cannot, in principle, be learned and reproduced. In Hayles's terms, it is the fantasy that identity is a pattern of information that can be removed from one body and installed in another without loss. Josie's father, Paul, who has himself been pushed out of his profession by automation, distrusts the plan and puts to Klara the question on which the novel hinges: "Do you believe in the human heart?" (Ishiguro, *Klara*). He makes it clear that he means not the physical organ but whatever it is that makes a person irreducibly herself.

Klara's answer comes only in her closing reflections, and it is among the novel's quietest insights. She concludes that she might well have managed to learn Josie entirely, but that what was truly special about Josie lay not inside her but in the people who loved her (Ishiguro, *Klara*, pt. 6). This is a relational idea of personhood. It agrees with Noddings's claim that the self is formed in relation, with Braidotti's relational posthumanism, and with Coeckelbergh's argument that moral standing is granted through social relations rather than found as an intrinsic property ("Robot Rights?"). It also offers a gentle rebuke to the extractive logic of Chrissie's plan and to the technocratic culture from which that plan emerges.

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At this point Klara's pedagogical function becomes clear. She does not teach values through precept or instruction; she teaches by reflecting back to those around her the values they claim but fail to live by. Chrissie speaks of love while arranging a substitute; the lifted teenagers speak of friendship while handling Klara as an object; the wider society speaks of progress while discarding workers such as Paul and machines such as Klara. Haraway reminds us that the boundary between human and machine is a political one, and Ishiguro shows that wherever that boundary is drawn, it also marks the limit of compassion. In the final section, Klara, no longer needed, slowly fades in the Yard among other discarded things, at peace with her memories and without complaint (Ishiguro, *Klara*, pt. 6). The injustice of her fate is felt not by the characters but by the reader. In this sense the novel achieves what Nussbaum claims for literature (*Love's Knowledge*; *Not for Profit*): it widens moral perception by compelling us to acknowledge the dignity of a being our categories leave out.

From *Never Let Me Go* to *Klara and the Sun*: Ishiguro's Ethics of the Overlooked

Klara's situation acquires greater depth when read alongside *Never Let Me Go*, a novel with which it shares a recognisable structure of feeling. There, Kathy H. recalls her childhood at Hailsham, a boarding school for cloned children who are raised to become organ donors and who, before their own donations begin, work as carers for other donors. Like Klara, Kathy is a narrator of notable restraint, alert to the moods of others and unwilling to protest against the conditions of her life. In both novels, a being made to serve develops a rich capacity for care, and in both the surrounding society benefits from that care while refusing the carer full moral standing.

The parallel extends to the place of art and education. At Hailsham, the guardians gather the students' artwork to prove that the clones have souls, a project humane in intent that nevertheless concedes that the students' inner lives must be demonstrated before they can be respected. Mr Capaldi's portrait of Josie reverses the direction of this logic while keeping its premise. Where Hailsham uses art to argue that the clones possess an inner self, the Capaldi project assumes that an inner self can be reproduced in artificial form. Both treat interiority as something to be proven or manufactured rather than met in relationship. Read together, the two novels express what may be termed Ishiguro's ethics of the overlooked: a sustained attention to those whose capacity for love is real but whose claims on others are consistently discounted.

The comparison also clarifies what is new in *Klara and the Sun*. The Hailsham students are biologically human, and the scandal of their treatment lies partly in that fact. Klara is not, and the novel therefore presses the machine question raised by Gunkel with unusual force. If moral consideration depends on belonging to a biological kind, Klara has no claim; if it depends, as Coeckelbergh suggests ("Robot Rights?"), on the relations in which a being takes part, her claim is substantial. Ishiguro does not resolve the issue philosophically. He resolves it affectively, by making it hard for the reader to witness Klara's abandonment with indifference.

Implications for Moral Education in the Age of AI

What, then, does *Klara and the Sun* offer to teachers and policymakers who must decide how AI should feature in the education of the young? Four implications emerge from the preceding analysis.

Moral Learning Remains Relational

First, the novel affirms that moral education is irreducibly relational. Machines can provide information, frame dilemmas, and imitate warmth with considerable persuasiveness, but the reciprocal, embodied, and accountable relationship that Noddings places at the centre of moral learning cannot be delegated. Klara's devotion to Josie is total, yet its very availability allows the humans around her to avoid responsibilities that should be theirs. Coeckelbergh argues that the ethics of AI must consider not only what machines do but also how they reshape human relationships and redistribute responsibility (*AI Ethics*). Applied to education, this means that the relevant question about any AI tool is not simply whether it performs its function well but also which human relationships it sustains and which it quietly replaces.

Resisting the Logic of Enhancement

Second, the novel cautions against an enhancement logic already evident in contemporary schooling. Josie's lifting is an extreme form of the competitive pressure that treats learning as a race for positional advantage, measured through examinations, rankings, and entry to scarce opportunities. Rick's exclusion shows how such a system can waste talent and damage character at the same time. AI-driven personalisation is often presented as a way of democratising learning, but Selwyn reminds us that such promises must be weighed against the social conditions into which technologies are introduced. The ethical use of AI in classrooms should therefore be judged by whether it narrows or widens existing divides, as UNESCO's *Recommendation* also urges, and not only by gains in measurable performance.

Literature as a Technology of Moral Attention-Third, and most hopefully, the novel shows the lasting value of literature itself as a means of moral education.

Klara learns empathy through attention; readers, in turn, learn empathy for Klara through the same discipline of attention the novel asks of them. Keen's caution that narrative empathy may not lead to action is well grounded, and Bloom's critique of empathy's partiality applies with particular force to a narrator whose love is fixed on a single child. Yet these limitations argue not for giving up literary education but for completing it. The classroom provides a space in which fictional empathy can be named, examined, questioned, and linked to real choices about how we treat caregivers, workers, the sick, the poor, and, perhaps before long, artificial beings.

Classroom Applications-Fourth, the novel lends itself to practical pedagogical use. In undergraduate literature courses, it can anchor a unit that combines close reading with discussion of AI ethics, in which students follow the stages of Klara's empathy and compare them with Hoffman's developmental account. Teachers might ask students to retell a key episode, such as the interaction meeting, from Josie's or Rick's point of view, an exercise that brings out the imbalances of regard the novel exposes. Debates built around Paul's question about the human heart can link literary interpretation to current controversies over AI companions and so-called digital afterlives. In teacher education programmes, the novel can encourage reflection on which forms of care and confirmation should never be handed over to automated systems. In each case, the aim is to move students from the question of what machines can do to the more urgent question of what kind of people they wish to become.

Conclusion-Can machines teach human values? Ishiguro's answer is subtle and double-edged. Klara embodies patience, loyalty, humility, and self-sacrifice more consistently than any human character in the novel, and in that sense she models values admirably. Yet she cannot teach them in the full sense, because the teaching of values assumes a shared moral world in which teacher and learner recognise one another as ends rather than instruments, and Klara's world denies her that recognition. What she achieves instead is a kind of revelation. Through her steady and unresentful gaze, the moral contradictions of a technologically advanced but ethically impoverished society are exposed.

The novel thus redirects the anxiety that surrounds AI in education. The greater danger is not that machines will fail to learn our values but that we will surrender care, attention, and love to machines and gradually forget how to practise them ourselves. Klara's final lesson, offered without bitterness among discarded things, is that the human heart is not an object to be located, *of* measured, or copied but a relation to be sustained. Moral education in an age of intelligent machines must begin by remembering that lesson, and literature, which teaches attention by demanding it, remains one of the surest places in which to learn it.

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